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Abstract
The ultimate objective of the present paper is to empirically investigate the effectiveness
of competition policy in developed and developing countries. Although its importance
is continuously increasing, the effectiveness of competition policy still seems to lack the
attention that it would deserve. At the present state of art, the number of academic con-
tributions that attempts to estimate its impact on relevant economic variables appears
very limited, in particular for the less developed countries. However, an empirical litera-
ture aimed at measuring in objective terms the effect of competition policy on economic
growth is emerging, starting from narrow variables of interest, such as Gross Domestic
Product and Total Factor Productivity. As a result, the principal aim of the current
work is to contribute to this branch of research, focusing on broader indicators of market
performance, in order to understand whether the presence of an antitrust authority has a
significant impact, thus an effective utility, on the level of competition of a country.
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the competitive element within the team. It was great. But hard to live with≫.
Paul McCartney
1 Research Proposal
The ultimate objective of the present paper is to investigate empirically the effec-
tiveness of competition policy in developed and developing countries. Although its
importance is continuously increasing, competition policy still seems to lack the
attention it would deserve. At the present state of art, the number of academic
contributions that attempts to estimate its impact on relevant economic variables
appears very limited, in particular for the less developed countries. However, an
empirical literature aimed at measuring in objective terms the effect of competition
policy on economic growth is emerging, starting from narrow variables of interest,
such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Total Factor Productivity (TFP).
As a result, the principal aim of the current work is to contribute to this branch
of research, focusing on broader indicators of market performance, in order to un-
derstand whether the presence of an antitrust authority has a significant impact,
thus an effective utility, on the level of competition of a country. In other terms,
the research question behind the current work is rather straightforward: is a com-
petition authority active in a developed or developing country able to implement
effectively its primary role? If not, which are the institutional functions and powers
that should be strengthened?
From a policy perspective, the aim of the present paper is also to comprehend
whether the enforcement of a competition policy regime in a developing country
has the same beneficial effects on the intensity of competition usually claimed by
the most developed countries. At the same time, it may be understood whether
industrial and institutional differences jeopardizes the effectiveness of a such tool of
political economy, so much that in emerging countries it would be more worth to
assign funds and priority to other tools of economic development.
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2 Literature Review
According to the mainstream economic school of thought, competition is the critical
process for a market economy to ensure the optimal allocation of resources and the
highest level of social welfare. As it is common knowledge, in fact, competitive mar-
kets enable consumers to purchase better products at lower prices and incentivize
firms to improve the quality of the goods and services offered. However, notwith-
standing its natural benefits, the functioning of competition is not automatic but
must be sustained through an intervention by the state, which normally occurs with
the adoption of a competition legislation and the creation of a competition authority
predisposed to the role of promoter of market democracy. Nevertheless, despite the
general consensus, at least from a theoretical standpoint, on the necessity of foster-
ing competition in order to support economic efficiency and fairness on the markets,
what appears extremely surprising is the almost absence of academic contributions
trying to assess empirically the effectiveness of competition policy. In the present
section, therefore, we provide a brief and exhaustive overview of the rather few re-
sults obtained in the empirical literature.
Dutz and Vagliasindi (2000)1 are the first to overtake the traditional and subjec-
tive indicators typical of the previous literature, which was limited to an evaluation
of the competition legislations as “in the books”. The authors, in fact, exploiting
cross-sectional data and looking at the actual practice in 18 transition countries,
measure the effectiveness of the different competition policy regimes according to
three criteria (i.e. 1. enforcement; 2. competition advocacy; 3. institutional effec-
tiveness). The main result is a positive impact of competition policy on the intensity
of competition, the latter as captured by an indicator of economy-wide enterprise
mobility. However, the essential drawback of the study remains the low number of
countries for which data are available.
Krakowski (2005)2, after a regression analysis for a sample of 101 countries,
reaches two main conclusions: firstly, the experience of the competition authority
and the institutional quality of the government explain a substantial part of the
1Dutz, M.A., Vagliasindi, M. (2000), Competition Policy Implementation in Transition
Economies: An Empirical Assessment, European Economic Review, Vol. 44, Elsevier, Amster-
dam, The Netherlands, pp. 762-772.
2Krakowski, M. (2005), Competition Policy Works: The Effect of Competition Policy on the
Intensity of Competition. An International Cross-Country Comparison, Hamburg Institute of
International Economics, Discussion Paper No. 332, Hamburg, Germany, pp. 1-18.
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perception of the effectiveness of competition policy; secondly, the perceived effec-
tiveness of competition policy and the size of the economy are of significant influence
on the perceived intensity of local competition, while the presence of an external
protection policy seems to not have any impact.
Kee and Hoekman (2007)3, analyzing a dataset of 42 countries and 18 industries
from 1981 to 1998 and controlling for the number of firms and imports, study the
effect of competition policy on a derived industry mark-up function of price over
marginal cost, which is taken as a proxy for the intensity of competition. Although
no significant impact is found, the authors observe that market entry is facilitated
by the existence of a competition legislation, thus it has an indirect and positive
effect on the level of domestic competition. The main drawback of the contribution
is that it simply employs a binary variable indicating whether a competition policy
regime is in force.
Petersen (2013)4, using a dataset of 154 countries from 1960 to 2005, finds that
competition policy has a strong effect on the level of GDP after ten years, whilst
there is no relevant impact on the quality of democracy. Thus, economic decon-
centration seems to not favor the transition to a democratic regime or to strength
the stability of an established democracy. The most plausible reason for this might
be that competition policy is not designed to prevent economic concentration at
conglomerate and national level (fact that, in turn, could promote democracy) but
only in particular and specific sectors. Also here, the main weakness of the study is
that the effect of competition policy is merely controlled for by a dummy variable.
In the end, Buccirossi et al. (2013)5 estimate the impact of competition policy on
productivity growth, analyzing a sample of 22 industries in 12 OECD countries from
1995 to 2005. In order to measure the effectiveness of the different competition policy
regimes, the authors construct, principally on the base of a tailored questionnaire,
a set of Competition Policy Indicators (CPIs), assessing, for each country and each
3Kee, H.L., Hoekman, B. (2007), Imports, Entry and Competition Law as Market Disciplines,
European Economic Review, Volume 51, Issue 4, Elsevier, Philidelphia, United States, pp. 831-858.
4Petersen, N. (2013), Antitrust Law and the Promotion of Democracy and Economic Growth,
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 9, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United King-
dom, pp. 593-636.
5Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., Vitale, C. (2013), Competition Policy and
Productivity Growth: An Empirical Essessment, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.
95(4), MIT Press, Cambridge, United States, pp. 1324-1336.
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year, the antitrust infringements (the Antitrust CPI), the merger control process (the
Mergers CPI), the institutional features (the Institutional CPI), the enforcement
features (the Enforcement CPI) and all the information on the competition policy
regime in a jurisdiction (the Aggregate CPI). The main conclusion is essentially a
positive and significant relationship between competition policy and TFP. Although
the only drawback of the contribution is the small size of the sample, exclusively
restricted to a part of the OECD countries, the methodology adopted as well as
the indicators built will certainly be very useful for future in-depth analyses and
refinements.
3 Dataset Description
In the present paper, the empirical assessment has been divided into two main parts.
The first part is dedicated to analyze developed and developing countries together,
in order to obtain a general overview of the phenomenon studied, while the second
part is devoted to examine exclusively developing countries, in order to understand
whether the adoption of a competition policy regime should be among the priorities
in the political agenda of an emerging country. The main reason for this distinction
is to disentangle the effect of competition policy in such different contexts. This
comparison may provide a better picture of the impact, also because in developing
countries competition policy has been introduced only recently in comparison to
developed countries (cf. Appendix A - Figure A.1 & A.2).
Accordingly, the first group includes the majority of OECD countries (i.e. 28
nations), whilst the second group includes all the developing countries for which
data for the purposes of the current work are available (i.e. 51 nations). Hence,
the total number of countries present in the sample is 79 (by 2008, 111 countries
had enacted a competition legislation6). The result is a cross-sectional dataset,
created ad hoc merging several existing datasets, with 2008 as common reference
year. At this stage, it is important to point out that in the empirical analysis at
issue, in a broader sense, for competition policy we mean any national law which
promotes market fairness by regulating anti-competitive conducts undertaken by
firms, while for competition authority we mean any institution which is predisposed
to its enforcement and is not sector specific.
6Papadopoulos, A.S. (2010), The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kindom, p. 15.
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The independent variables block of our dataset, i.e. the set of input variables to
be tested in order to verify if they are the cause of the phenomenon object of study,
results from a questionnaire submitted to competition agencies worldwide in 2007
and from which four indicators relative to the institutional quality of competition
policy of each country are derived and used in Voigt (2009)7. In particular, the sur-
vey, whose response rate is around 63%, was sent to 140 agencies belonging to the
International Competition Network or participating to the Intergovernmental Group
of Experts on Competition Law and Policy. The questionnaire was constructed so
that respondants would not have to express personal perceptions but provide factual
information about the national competition policies. For this reason, it is possible
to state that the group of variables at issue is based on objective indicators and
not subjective ones that instead might imply measurement errors (cf. Appendix A
- Table A.1.1 & A.1.2).
The dependent variables block of our dataset, i.e. the set of output variables to
be tested in order to verify if they are instead the effect of the phenomenon object of
study, results from the Global Competitiveness Report, annually published by the
World Economic Forum (2013), which assesses the class of factors, institutions and
policies that influence the current and medium-term levels of economic prosperity
of 144 different countries. Since 2004, the report proposes a wide range of data,
based on 110 variables and 12 pillars, about areas such as competition, education,
finance, health, infrastructure, institutions, labour and technology, mainly as a re-
sult of over 15,000 surveys with leading business executives who are asked to rank
the determinants of competitiveness of the respective countries. This corresponds to
an average of 100 respondents per country. Interestingly for our purposes, the study
offers the Global Competitiveness Indexes (GCI)8 measuring the microeconomic and
macroeconomic foundations of national competitiveness worldwide (cf. Appendix A
- Table A.2.1 & A.2.2).
In this regard, it is necessary to notice that, at least at the present state of
art, there is a practical impossibility to find objective data about the intensity of
market power, solution that would represent of course a first best scenario for our
7Voigt, S. (2009), The Effects of Competition Policy on Development. Cross-Country Evidence
Using Four New Indicators, The Journal of Development Studies, Volume 45, Issue 8, Routledge,
London, United Kindom, pp. 1225-1248.
8World Economic Forum (2013), The Global Competitiveness Index 2012-2013 Data Platform,
Geneva, Switzerland, available on the web-site www.weforum.org.
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study. The basic reason for this limitation is that data such as level of concentration,
mark-up on prices or number of market entries are available only for specific sectors
of certain nations and in any case would remain rather insignificant if computed
with respect to an entire economy. Thus, we are forced to proceed to a second best
scenario, that is to recur to indicators of market performance obtained from evalu-
ations expressed by business respondents about the personal opinion of a country’s
intensity of competition. Despite the unavoidable drawbacks that this solution en-
tails, being data extracted from surveys not perfectly objective, the present paper
still desires to investigate at a macroeconomic and preliminary level whether the
presence of a competition authority affects the degree of competition of a nation.
Future research, having at its disposal more rigorous and significant data, could
certainly provide further answers to the research question at issue.
4 Econometric Model
The econometric model developed for the present paper aims at estimating in de-
veloped and developing countries the effect on market performance of competition
policy, the latter evaluated according to four institutional indicators. These indi-
cators, built in Voigt (2009) and originally used to assess empirically the impact
of competition policy on TFP, basically reflect: 1. the substantive content of the
competition law; 2. the degree to which the competition law incorporates an eco-
nomic approach; 3. the formal independence of the competition authority; 4. the
factual independence of the competition authority. In particular, as mentioned in
the previous section, this set of indicators has been constructed as a result of a
questionnaire formed of 30 questions and submitted to 140 competition authorities
worldwide. Each institutional indicator has been adjusted and weighted in order
to take a value between 0 and 1, where a greater value implies a higher degree of
competition orientation or authority independence.
The first institutional indicator, related to the substantive content of the com-
petition law, results from 5 questions: if the constitution of the country mentions
competition as a right to be protected; if a specific legislation promoting competi-
tion is enforced; the number of other objectives, beyond competition in the strict
sense, the competition law safeguards (e.g. employment, innovation, international
trade, regional development, small and medium enterprises); the number of years
the competition law has been in place; the number of anti-competitive practices for
which the competition law provides measures and remedies (e.g. abuse of dominant
position, cartel, merger, predatory pricing, price discrimination).
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The second institutional indicator, concerning the degree to which the compe-
tition law rely on an economic reasoning, results from 3 questions: the number of
anti-competitive practices for which a rule of reason (i.e. case-by-case and effects-
based approach) instead of a per se rule (i.e. formal and legal-based approach) is
applied; the number of concepts and theories developed by economists in recent
years which are contemplated by the competition law (e.g. collective dominance,
conglomerate effects, effects doctrine, leniency programs); in case of merger control,
if efficiencies and remedies are set forth by the competition law, under the assump-
tion that both instruments reflect a rule of reason rather than a per se rule.
The third institutional indicator, related to the formal independence of the com-
petition authority, results from 13 questions: if the competition authority is super-
vised by and subject to the power of the government; if members of the government
can issue instructions to or overrule the decisions provided by the competition au-
thority; if the decisions of the competition authority are subject to judicial review by
the courts; if competition is the only objective pursued by the competition author-
ity or there are other tasks; the number of competences assigned to the competition
authority; the level of influence of the government on the appointment of the com-
petition authority’s head; the length of service of the competition authority’s head;
if the competition authority’s head can be re-elected and how can be dismissed; if
there is a rule preventing reduction in wages for the officials; if there is a rule for
the allocation of incoming cases among the officials; if the competition authority is
required to publish the motivations of the decisions rendered.
The fourth indicator, concerning the factual independence of the competition
authority, results from 9 questions: if there is one or more authorities in charge of the
application of the competition legislation (e.g., as in the United States, the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission); if on
average the effective length of service of the officials corresponds with the expected
one; if the budget of the competition authority and the income of the officials have
at least remained constant in real terms since 1990; how many times members of
the government have issued instructions to and overruled decisions provided by the
competition authority between 1990 and 2000; if courts have referred to any policy
objective other than competition in order to overrule a decision of the competition
authority; if the competition authority has the power to open a proceeding by itself
or it needs the intervention of other parties (e.g. competitors, consumers, court,
government, parliament); in case of merger control, how many months on average
pass from the preliminary notification until the final decision of the highest court.
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As a result, the four institutional indicators, which basically evaluate the degree
of competition orientation and authority independence of developed and developing
countries, are investigated in the current work on five indicators of market perfor-
mance, being here interested in verifying whether the former has a direct effect on
the latter. These five indicators of market performance, built by the World Eco-
nomic Forum (2013), essentially measure: 1. the intensity of local competition; 2.
the extent of market dominance; 3. the effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy; 4.
the intensity of national competition; 5. the goods market efficiency. In particular,
as mentioned in the previous section, this set of indicators has been extracted from
the 6th pillar (i.e. Goods Market Efficiency) of the Global Competitiveness Indexes
(GCI), which in turn have been constructed as a result of over 15,000 surveys with
leading business executives working in 144 countries worldwide. Each performance
indicator has been adjusted and weighted in order to take a value between 1 and 7,
where a greater value implies a higher degree of market efficiency.
The first performance indicator results from the question asked to business exec-
utives to assess the intensity of competition in the respective local markets, ranging
from limited to intense in most industries; the second performance indicator results
from the question to characterize the corporate activity in the respective countries,
ranging from dominated by a few business groups to spread among many firms; the
third performance indicator results from the question to evaluate to what extent
anti-monopoly policy promotes competition in the respective countries; the fourth
and fifth performance indicators result from the questions to evaluate the intensity
of competition and the goods market efficiency at aggregate and national level.
Accordingly, in our econometric model, the four institutional indicators are em-
ployed as explanatory and independent variables, whilst the five performance indi-
cators are used as explained and dependent variables. Nevertheless, all the variables
that may affect the relationship between the variables of primary interest must be
monitored, even though they may not be the focus of the study. Control variables,
in fact, allow the econometrician to strictly measure the effect under examination,
avoiding the so-called omitted-variables bias and improving the goodness of fit of
the econometric model. Therefore, along the lines of Voigt (2009), we employ four
standard economic control variables, such as the government consumption, the trade
openness, the rate of inflation (Heston et al., 2002)9 and the patents protection (U.S.
9Aten, B., Heston, A., Summers, R. (2002), Penn World Table, Center for International Com-
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Department of Commerce, 2005)10, under the reasonable assumption that they are
all factors which influence, positively or negatively, the establishment of a competi-
tive environment. Moreover, we must consider two other control variables, that are
an EU dummy, being present in our dataset countries members of the European
Union subject not only to the respective national competition authorities but also
to the vigilance exercised by the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP)
of the European Commission, and an OECD dummy, being present in our dataset
as well countries members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) which are characterized by a higher level of social welfare (cf.
Appendix A - Table A.3.1 & A.3.2). The five control variables are the same for the
five dependent variables, since the performance indicators are likely to be affected
by similar dynamics. As a result, our regression equation can be written as follow:
PERFi = α + β(COMPi) + γ(CTRLi) + εi
Furthermore, the high intensity of competition typical of developed countries, as
well as the high extent of market dominance typical of developing countries, might
facilitate the establishment and the effectiveness of a competition authority. This
mechanism raises the question of endogeneity, as reverse causality (i.e. the effect
precedes the cause, contrary to normal causation) might emerge between the depen-
dent and independent variables of our econometric model. In order to deal with this
issue, we employ a further category of variables, that are the instrumental variables.
In a nutshell, an instrument is a variable, not present in the regression equation,
which affects the explained variable only through its effect on the explanatory vari-
able, meaning that it is correlated with the latter but not with the (error term
of the) former. Using an instrumental variable is therefore a method to clean out
any endogenous relationship between dependent and independent variables, since
we obtain new and filtered explanatory variables which can be correctly tested on
the explained variables. In particular, in our econometric model, we use the same
three instrumental variables for each of the four independent variables. Actually,
endogeneity problems may still remain due to omitted variables. For this reason, as
above-mentioned, we recur to several controls as well.
parisons at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, United States, available on the web-site
pwt.sas.upenn.edu.
10U.S. Department of Commerce (2005), Patent Counts by Country/State and Year, Utility
Patents Report, Alexandria, United States, available on the web-site www.uspto.gov.
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The first instrument is a dummy variable for former British colonies (Heston et
al., 2002). As proved by historical evidence, a common law legal system, typical of
countries that in the past belonged to the British Empire, is more likely to adopt
a competition policy regime than a civil law legal system, so that the rule of law
influences the enforcement of an institution such as a competition authority. The
second instrument is the age of democratic regime (Keefer et al., 2013)11, under the
assumption that a country with a longer democratic tradition is in more suitable
conditions to establish and enforce a competition policy regime. The third instru-
ment is the ethnic and linguistic fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003)12, element
that traduces the difficulty of implementing valuable institutions (cf. Appendix A -
Table A.4.1 & A.4.2).
We can now proceed with the estimation phase. At a first step, we will employ
as estimation technique the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), without and with con-
trol variables, in order to carry out a preliminary assessment. At a second step,
after evaluating the validity of the instruments chosen through the Sargan test, we
will employ as estimation techniques the Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) and the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), being able to improve the prediction qual-
ity of our econometric model exploiting the information provided by the instruments.
5 Estimation Results
In order to obtain a general overview of the phenomenon object of study, as above-
mentioned, firstly we analyze developed and developing countries together. From
Table 1, which contains the OLS regression estimates without and with the stan-
dard economic control variables, basically we can observe that all the institutional
indicators present the desired sign, that is a positive impact on all the performance
indicators, although rather marginal but more significant when control variables are
considered. In words, this means that competition authorities, even tough to some
extent, are usually able to implement effectively the role of promoters of fair com-
11Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., Walsh, P. (2001), New Tools in Comparative
Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions, World Bank Economic Review, The
World Bank, Washington D.C., United States, pp. 165-176, available (updated to 2013) on the
web-site www.worldbank.org.
12Alesina, A. et al. (2003), Fractionalization, Journal of Economic Growth, Volume 8, Issue 2,
pp. 155-194.
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petition. From Table 2, which contains instead the OLS regression estimates when
exclusively developing countries are examined, we can observe that only the formal
independence of the competition authorities positively impacts on the performance
indicators, while the degree to which the competition law incorporates an economic
approach and the formal independence of the competition authority present a sig-
nificant impact in a limited number of cases. On the contrary, the fact that an
emerging country has adopted a specific legislation safeguarding competition seems
to not have any real effect on the markets.
For a more sophisticated inference analysis based on estimation methods such as
2SLS and GMM it is necessary first of all to check the relevance of the instruments
chosen. In an overidentified model like ours, where the number of instrumental vari-
ables exceeds the number of explanatory variables, we can use the Sargan’s test to
verify the validity of the instruments selected. The Sargan’s statistic, which is a
particular case of the Hansen’s test for overidentified restrictions, is distributed as
a Chi-Squared with K - L degrees of freedom, where K is equal to the number of
instruments and L is equal to the numbers of endogenous regressors in the original
model, under the null hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with the instru-
ments. Therefore, in the present setting, we have two degrees of freedom, having
for each regression equation three instruments and one endogenous regressor. The
validity of the instruments for all four institutional indicators of both developed and
developing countries has been tested. The result is similar for all, that is a p-value
higher than the standard level of significance of 0.05, thus we cannot reject the null
hypothesis and we can conclude that the overidentifying restriction is valid. Con-
sequently, even though this test has low power and provides no guarantee that the
instruments used are valid, it brings further evidence to support the direction of our
results.
Proceeding with the more advanced estimation techniques, from Table 3, which
contains the 2SLS and GMM regression estimates for the entire sample, we can
observe results that confirm what obtained in Table 1. Although the substantive
content of the competition law seems to lose statistical significance, what emerges
and is more important for our purposes is that the estimates for the other three in-
stitutional indicators are stronger than those obtained through the OLS estimation,
reaching in several cases the standard significance level of 5%. Instead, from Table 4,
which presents the 2SLS and GMM regression estimates only for the subsample, we
can observe results that confirm as well what stated in Table 2, that is the fact that
in emerging countries the factual independence of competition authorities seems to
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matter most. Furthermore, the impact of the formal independence of competition
authorities appears strengthened in comparison to that one obtained through the
OLS estimation, whilst the presence of economists still maintains a positive effect
in some cases.
6 Policy Conclusions
In the present paper, the final aim has been essentially to investigate the effective-
ness of competition policy in developed and developing countries from an empirical
standpoint. It has shown that four competition indicators, originally built to explain
differences in productivity, once controlled with the proper economic and institu-
tional variables, seem to have an effect on five market indicators. Although not
particularly strong, the presence of a competition authority appears rather useful in
increasing the degree of competition of a country.
In particular, two are the main results that come to light. Firstly, as a general
trend, apart from the mere adoption of a competition legislation by the national
parliaments, all the institutional indicators exercise a positive impact on the mar-
kets, therefore competition authorities seem to be effective in enhancing the level of
competitiveness of the respective countries. Secondly, as for the poorer countries,
with respect to which we are interested in verifying whether the enforcement of a
competition policy regime should be favored, what seems most important for its
effectiveness is above all to guarantee the factual independence of the authorities
predisposed. The essential reason for this should be found in the fact that the qual-
ity of the institutions of the developing countries is certainly lower than the one of
the industrialized nations, being affected more frequently for example by cases of
corruption or government interference. In any case, one conclusion seems certain,
that is competition policy is not harmful to development.
However, as above-mentioned, it should be also taken into consideration that the
emerging countries, historically characterized by the nationalization of basic indus-
tries, are still adopting or constructing primordial competition policy frameworks,
results of which could be seen only in delay, so in the near future. Actually, to be
more precise, 81 of the 111 of the existing competition authorities worldwide have
been created only in the last twenty years. Moreover, private enforcement, although
still in an embryonic phase even in the developed countries, could undoubtedly make
the market surveillance, thus the market efficiency, stronger.
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As a result, the current work shows that in developed countries competition
policy has actually beneficial effects on the intensity of competition, result so far
unclear and often claimed only on the paper or taken for granted, while in developing
countries it shows that is not the mere existence or the degree of competence but
the institutional quality of the competition authorities that matters most for the
effectiveness of a competition policy regime. In both cases, therefore, the creation
of a competition authority is definitely worth, even though its functions and powers
should be strengthened in order to register a more significant impact on the markets
in comparison to the current results. Future research, exploiting more precise and
significant data that we hope will be available soon (e.g. panel data concerning
specific sectors and not as here cross-sectional data related to an entire economy),
could certainly offer further support to the conclusions reached in the present study.
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Table 1 - OLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators without/with Control Variables
(Developed and Developing Countries)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competiton competiton efficiency efficiency
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
COMPlaw 1.331
∗∗∗ 0.431 1.594∗∗∗ 0.245 1.785∗∗∗ 0.457 0.858∗∗ 0.066 1.123∗∗∗ 0.234
(0.316) (0.330) (0.454) (0.404) (0.448) (0.427) (0.299) (0.263) (0.309) (0.273)
R2 0.189 0.458 0.140 0.622 0.173 0.585 0.098 0.589 0.148 0.608
SER 0.675 0.550 0.968 0.671 0.955 0.711 0.638 0.438 0.659 0.455
N 78 69 78 69 78 69 78 69 78 69
COMPeconomics 1.068
∗∗∗ 0.604∗ 1.483∗∗∗ 0.825∗ 1.725∗∗∗ 1.176∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.536∗ 0.988∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗
(0.235) (0.287) (0.321) (0.331) (0.299) (0.322) (0.217) (0.210) (0.225) (0.218)
R2 0.228 0.492 0.233 0.671 0.322 0.685 0.170 0.666 0.216 0.686
SER 0.677 0.549 0.925 0.634 0.862 0.617 0.625 0.403 0.647 0.418
N 72 63 72 63 72 63 72 63 72 63
COMPdejure 1.452
∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗ 1.907∗∗∗ 1.264∗∗ 2.334∗∗∗ 1.806∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 1.324∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.314) (0.434) (0.375) (0.400) (0.360) (0.289) (0.240) (0.298) (0.244)
R2 0.234 0.526 0.212 0.679 0.321 0.702 0.166 0.667 0.215 0.697
SER 0.665 0.521 0.932 0.622 0.860 0.597 0.620 0.626 0.640 0.405
N 74 65 74 65 74 65 74 65 74 65
COMPdefacto 1.163
∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 1.568∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 1.818∗∗∗ 1.376∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.226) (0.288) (0.272) (0.259) (0.267) (0.200) (0.182) (0.203) (0.181)
R2 0.329 0.574 0.313 0.698 0.431 0.706 0.225 0.665 0.295 0.708
SER 0.629 0.512 0.880 0.615 0.791 0.604 0.612 0.413 0.620 0.411
N 67 59 67 59 67 59 67 59 67 59
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Control Variables: Government Consumption, Openness, Inflation, Patents, OECD, EU.
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Table 2 - OLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators without/with Control Variables
(Developing Countries)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competiton competiton efficiency efficiency
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
COMPlaw 0.538 0.389 0.006 0.074 0.273 0.341 -0.168 -0.236 0.174 0.120
(0.390) (0.416) (0.464) (0.489) (0.453) (0.516) (0.341) (0.314) (0.352) (0.334)
R2 0.038 0.299 0.000 0.370 0.008 0.295 0.005 0.495 0.005 0.469
SER 0.641 0.573 0.762 0.673 0.745 0.711 0.561 0.433 0.579 0.461
N 50 42 50 42 50 42 50 42 50 42
COMPeconomics 0.321 0.382 0.320 0.758 0.677
∗ 1.108∗∗ 0.094 0.405 0.279 0.583∗
(0.319) (0.392) (0.370) (0.422) (0.329) (0.384) (0.274) (0.259) (0.281) (0.274)
R2 0.024 0.329 0.018 0.477 0.092 0.510 0.003 0.619 0.023 0.610
SER 0.673 0.599 0.780 0.645 0.693 0.587 0.578 0.396 0.593 0.419
N 44 36 44 36 44 36 44 36 44 36
COMPdejure 0.708 0.818 0.774 1.116 1.236
∗∗ 1.664 0.347 0.649 0.580 0.839∗∗
(0.357) (0.384) (0.418) (0.429) (0.376) (0.396) (0.315) (0.278) (0.319) (0.285)
R2 0.082 0.378 0.072 0.488 0.197 0.547 0.027 0.583 0.070 0.597
SER 0.645 0.564 0.755 0.630 0.678 0.582 0.569 0.409 0.576 0.418
N 46 38 46 38 46 38 46 38 46 38
COMPdefacto 0.601
∗ 0.641∗ 0.648 0.843∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 1.362∗∗∗ 0.277 0.483∗ 0.474 0.664∗∗
(0.274) (0.298) (0.337) (0.355) (0.294) (0.318) (0.257) (0.228) (0.257) (0.228)
R2 0.110 0.427 0.087 0.497 0.256 0.584 0.029 0.598 0.080 0.629
SER 0.632 0.556 0.777 0.660 0.678 0.592 0.591 0.425 0.593 0.424
N 41 34 41 34 41 34 41 34 41 34
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Control Variables: Government Consumption, Openness, Inflation, Patents, OECD, EU.
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Table 3 - 2SLS and GMM Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators with Control and Instrumental Variables
(Developed and Developing Countries)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competition competition efficiency efficiency
Technique 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
COMPlaw 1.319 1.411 1.770 2.033 1.448 1.285 0.293 -0.065 0.980 0.806
(0.949) (0.816) (1.218) (1.065) (1.211) (0.796) (0.720) (0.495) (0.787) (0.523)
R2 0.394 0.377 0.534 0.499 0.549 0.545 0.583 0.580 0.561 0.574
SER 0.546 0.554 0.701 0.727 0.697 0.700 0.414 0.416 0.453 0.446
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
COMPeconomics 2.265 2.434
∗∗ 2.857 2.732∗ 3.734∗ 4.053∗ 1.486 1.778∗ 2.105 2.398∗∗
(1.407) (0.887) (1.660) (1.107) (1.824) (1.730) (0.952) (0.843) (1.132) (0.875)
R2 0.183 0.116 0.4460 0.472 0.3241 0.227 0.543 0.451 0.436 0.323
SER 0.651 0.677 0.76881 0.751 0.84442 0.903 0.441 0.483 0.524 0.574
N 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
COMPdejure 2.335
∗ 2.445 2.678∗ 2.636 4.689∗∗ 4.710 2.289∗ 2.404 2.586∗∗ 2.511
(1.111) (0.825) (1.295) (0.975) (1.622) (1.480) (0.945) (0.878) (0.994) (0.765)
R2 0.380 0.354 0.599 0.603 0.367 0.361 0.458 0.495 0.475 0.495
SER 0.558 0.570 0.651 0.648 0.815 0.818 0.475 0.490 0.500 0.490
N 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
COMPdefacto 1.880
∗ 1.999∗∗∗ 1.845∗ 1.823∗∗ 3.069∗∗ 3.292∗∗ 1.485∗ 1.747∗ 1.813∗ 1.994∗∗
(0.825) (0.567) (0.919) (0.660) (1.098) (1.206) (0.675) (0.751) (0.718) (0.702)
R2 0.400 0.357 0.635 0.636 0.473 0.406 0.515 0.410 0.517 0.444
SER 0.565 0.585 0.629 0.628 0.751 0.798 0.462 0.510 0.492 0.528
N 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Control Variables: Government Consumption, Openness, Inflation, Patents, OECD, EU.
Instrumental Variables: British Colony, Age of Democratic Regime, Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization.
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Table 4 - 2SLS and GMM Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators with Control and Instrumental Variables
(Developing Countries)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competition competition efficiency efficiency
Technique 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
COMPlaw 0.740 0.729 0.560 -0.114 -0.396 -0.482 -0.770 -0.861 0.025 -0.169
(1.028) (0.995) (1.211) (1.195) (1.297) (0.890) (0.799) (0.551) (0.818) (0.645)
R2 0.284 0.283 0.352 0.363 0.254 0.209 0.4535 0.437 0.468 0.456
SER 0.529 0.529 0.623 0.618 0.667 0.687 0.41112 0.417 0.421 0.426
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
COMPeconomics 1.972 2.004 2.624 2.463
∗ 2.383 2.407∗ -0.088 -0.138 0.872 0.883
(1.964) (1.034) (2.184) (1.167) (1.806) (1.130) (1.099) (0.676) (1.117) (0.668)
R2 0.125 0.182 0.125 0.182 0.324 0.309 0.571 0.550 0.595 0.591
SER 0.749 0.724 0.749 0.724 0.619 0.626 0.377 0.386 0.383 0.385
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
COMPdejure 1.438 1.746
∗∗∗ 2.149∗ 2.127∗∗ 3.192∗∗ 3.097∗∗∗ 1.438 1.746∗∗∗ 2.149∗ 2.127∗∗
(0.899) (0.466) (1.051) (0.675) (1.084) (0.892) (0.899) (0.466) (1.051) (0.675)
R2 0.325 0.257 0.392 0.394 0.330 0.557 0.325 0.257 0.392 0.394
SER 0.530 0.557 0.620 0.619 0.640 0.380 0.530 0.557 0.620 0.619
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
COMPdefacto 1.282
∗ 1.279∗∗∗ 1.458∗ 1.499∗∗∗ 2.087∗∗ 1.880∗ 0.826 0.620 1.040∗ 0.944∗
(0.618) (0.274) (0.715) (0.437) (0.665) (0.877) (0.455) (0.491) (0.457) (0.409)
R2 0.329 0.330 0.440 0.431 0.503 0.535 0.565 0.581 0.591 0.604
SER 0.536 0.536 0.620 0.625 0.576 0.558 0.394 0.387 0.396 0.390
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Control Variables: Government Consumption, Openness, Inflation, Patents, OECD, EU.
Instrumental Variables: British Colony, Age of Democratic Regime, Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization.
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Appendix A - Descriptive Data
Figure A.1 - Global Competitiveness Index Heat Map
Source: World Economic Forum (2013)
Figure A.2 - Global Competitiveness Index
Source: World Economic Forum (2013)
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Table A.1.1 - Competition Policy Indicators: Developed Countries (Independent Variables)
Country
x1 x2 x3 x4
COMPlaw COMPeconomics COMP dejure COMP defacto
Australia 0.620 0.389 0.592 0.872
Austria 0.322 0.595 0.523 n.a.
Belgium 0.288 0.750 0.331 0.800
Canada 0.474 0.667 0.554 0.798
Czech Republic 0.371 0.917 0.477 0.922
Denmark 0.404 0.903 0.508 0.944
Estonia 0.365 0.233 0.650 0.500
Finland 0.343 0.905 0.650 0.969
France 0.313 0.740 0.564 0.663
Germany 0.471 0.700 0.625 0.967
Greece 0.287 0.583 0.550 0.421
Hungary 0.499 0.972 0.630 0.802
Ireland 0.371 0.639 0.585 0.893
Israel 0.173 0.850 0.500 0.953
Italy 0.708 0.611 0.644 0.911
Japan 0.375 0.821 0.517 0.917
Mexico 0.324 0.476 0.442 0.722
Netherlands 0.474 0.722 0.417 1.000
New Zealand 0.454 0.319 0.485 0.550
Poland 0.249 0.816 0.425 0.781
Portugal 0.561 0.716 0.438 n.a.
Slovakia 0.663 0.840 0.525 0.678
Spain 0.453 0.774 0.692 0.933
Sweden 0.564 0.792 0.454 0.656
Switzerland 0.664 0.833 0.446 0.939
Turkey 0.696 0.357 0.618 0.922
United Kingdom 0.750 0.833 0.577 0.875
United States 0.667 0.611 0.459 0.372
Source: Voigt (2009)
Indicators
x1 = Substantive Content of the Competition Law
x2 = Degree to which the Competition Law incorporates an Economic Approach
x3 = Formal Independence of the Competition Authority
x4 = Factual Independence of the Competition Authority
[0 = min; 1 = max]
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Table A.1.2 - Competition Policy Indicators: Developing Countries (Independent Variables)
Country
x1 x2 x3 x4
COMPlaw COMPeconomics COMP dejure COMP defacto
Albania 0.318 0.792 0.410 n.a.
Argentina 0.612 0.667 0.362 0.450
Armenia 0.595 0.188 0.500 0.230
Bangladesh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Benin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bolivia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Brazil 0.664 0.500 0.581 0.903
Bulgaria 0.559 0.583 0.400 0.694
Chad 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
China 0.115 0.375 0.238 n.a.
Colombia 0.618 0.762 0.692 0.642
Costa Rica 0.360 0.472 0.542 0.814
Croatia 0.526 0.694 0.400 0.594
Cyprus 0.086 0.731 0.350 0.819
Dominican Republic 0.333 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ecuador 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Egypt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
El Salvador 0.333 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guatemala 0.333 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guyana 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Honduras 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Indonesia 0.181 0.786 0.548 0.708
Jamaica 0.240 0.143 0.607 0.772
Kazakhstan 0.080 0.000 0.417 0.775
Latvia 0.243 0.786 0.577 0.636
Lithuania 0.702 0.750 0.625 0.781
Madagascar 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Malaysia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mali 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mauritania 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Moldova 0.333 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Morocco 0.012 0.810 0.558 0.396
Mozambique 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nepal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nicaragua 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nigeria 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Paraguay 0.333 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Peru 0.621 0.643 0.446 0.572
Phillipines 0.550 n.a. 0.000 n.a.
Senegal 0.154 0.063 0.636 n.a.
Singapore 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
South Africa 0.073 n.a. 0.769 0.813
Taiwan 0.288 0.250 0.511 0.683
Tajikistan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tanzania 0.238 0.476 0.624 0.867
Thailand 0.323 0.214 0.417 n.a.
Uganda 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Venezuela 0.577 0.484 0.500 0.638
Vietnam 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Zambia 0.154 0.722 0.460 0.822
Zimbawe 0.023 0.595 0.457 0.714
Source: Voigt (2009)
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Table A.2.1 - Performance Indicators: Developed Countries (Dependent Variables)
Country
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
PERF local PERF dominace PERF antitrust PERF competition PERF efficiency
Australia 5.733 5.148 5.916 5.289 5.321
Austria 6.058 5.906 5.752 5.215 5.407
Belgium 5.966 5.399 5.518 5.032 5.201
Canada 5.671 5.174 5.464 5.161 5.259
Czech Republic 5.727 4.430 4.637 4.727 4.652
Denmark 5.566 5.777 5.940 5.358 5.431
Estonia 5.571 4.331 4.866 5.060 4.950
Finland 5.730 5.740 6.048 5.253 5.354
France 5.800 5.354 5.693 4.885 5.032
Germany 6.315 6.207 6.123 5.167 5.291
Greece 4.929 4.040 4.425 4.149 4.244
Hungary 5.425 3.769 4.534 4.509 4.258
Ireland 5.475 5.330 5.191 5.422 5.414
Israel 5.641 4.124 5.429 4.960 5.001
Italy 4.623 4.383 4.162 4.130 4.321
Japan 6.025 5.948 5.398 4.891 5.218
Mexico 4.905 3.301 3.623 4.152 4.230
Netherlands 5.883 5.792 5.986 5.329 5.368
New Zealand 5.402 4.675 5.633 5.366 5.354
Poland 4.725 4.183 3.957 4.215 4.123
Portugal 5.275 3.882 5.011 4.642 4.589
Slovakia 5.346 4.793 4.565 4.958 4.658
Spain 5.567 4.590 4.619 4.465 4.591
Sweden 6.016 5.234 5.824 5.223 5.370
Switzerland 5.527 5.948 5.321 5.167 5.389
Turkey 5.455 4.427 4.642 4.566 4.538
United Kingdom 5.985 5.680 5.820 5.281 5.295
United States 5.904 5.694 5.498 5.226 5.317
Source: World Economic Forum (2013)
Indicators
y1 = Intensity of Local Competition
(“How would you assess the intensity of competition in the local markets in your country?”)
[1 = limited in most industries; 7 = intense in most industries]
y2 = Extent of Market Dominance
(“How would you characterize corporate activity in your country?”)
[1 = dominated by a few business groups; 7 = spread among many firms]
y3 = Effectiveness of Anti-Monopoly Policy
(“To what extent does anti-monopoly policy promote competition in your country?”)
[1 = does not promote competition; 7 = effectively promotes competition]
Aggregate Indicators
y4 = Competition
[1 = min; 7 = max]
y5 = Good Market Efficiency
[1 = min; 7 = max]
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Table A.2.2 - Performance Indicators: Developing Countries (Dependent Variables)
Country
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
PERF local PERF dominace PERF antitrust PERF efficiency PERF efficiency
Albania 3.665 2.866 2.833 3.536 3.506
Argentina 4.156 3.248 3.336 3.326 3.528
Armenia 3.634 2.475 2.518 3.770 3.713
Bangladesh 4.736 2.755 2.820 3.906 3.838
Benin 4.328 3.779 3.743 3.906 3.760
Bolivia 4.091 3.133 2.875 3.431 3.260
Brazil 5.252 4.157 4.273 3.572 3.803
Bulgaria 4.497 3.689 3.248 3.910 3.891
Chad 3.215 2.960 2.831 3.022 2.843
China 5.338 3.761 3.688 4.205 4.258
Colombia 4.936 3.142 3.927 3.727 3.927
Costa Rica 5.104 4.493 3.941 4.214 4.397
Croatia 4.974 3.553 3.730 4.126 4.103
Cyprus 5.371 4.201 4.837 4.611 4.653
Dominican Republic 4.355 2.918 2.888 3.610 3.736
Ecuador 4.246 2.547 2.616 3.456 3.349
Egypt 4.712 3.934 3.507 4.150 4.031
El Salvador 4.894 3.103 3.477 4.342 4.320
Guatemala 5.007 3.690 3.287 4.251 4.228
Guyana 4.245 2.920 3.019 3.904 3.717
Honduras 4.182 3.033 3.418 3.981 3.905
Indonesia 5.510 5.228 5.147 4.884 5.058
Jamaica 5.140 3.776 5.398 4.370 4.291
Kazakhstan 4.666 3.441 3.505 4.088 4.200
Latvia 4.976 3.766 3.954 4.534 4.472
Lithuania 5.365 3.842 4.354 4.475 4.518
Madagascar 4.142 2.998 3.294 3.922 3.713
Malaysia 5.665 5.106 4.911 5.171 5.201
Mali 4.374 4.044 3.474 4.051 3.819
Mauritania 3.688 2.874 3.408 3.440 3.418
Moldova n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Morocco 4.575 3.733 4.129 4.175 4.131
Mozambique 3.610 2.778 2.964 3.441 3.221
Nepal 4.585 2.499 3.059 3.870 3.730
Nicaragua 4.013 2.514 2.851 3.771 3.613
Nigeria 4.486 3.919 3.690 4.258 4.189
Paraguay 4.118 3.026 2.735 3.594 3.514
Peru 5.091 3.397 3.783 4.079 4.136
Phillipines 5.019 3.023 3.575 4.037 4.191
Senegal 5.128 3.950 3.154 4.026 3.982
Singapore 5.482 5.225 5.076 5.931 5.762
South Africa 5.091 4.418 5.388 4.800 4.732
Taiwan 5.797 5.605 5.033 5.059 5.230
Tajikistan 4.014 3.091 3.347 3.400 3.472
Tanzania 4.486 3.245 3.812 4.056 3.922
Thailand 5.296 4.077 4.054 4.605 4.663
Uganda 4.725 2.916 3.326 3.802 3.665
Venezuela 3.693 3.072 3.566 3.056 3.276
Vietnam 4.982 4.314 3.161 4.073 4.070
Zambia 3.425 2.606 3.170 4.023 3.609
Zimbawe 3.419 3.273 3.371 3.090 3.152
Source: World Economic Forum (2013)
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Table A.3.1 - Socio-Economic Variables: Developed Countries (Control Variables)
Country
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6
CTRL CTRL CTRL CTRL CTRL CTRL
govtcons1 openness1 inflation1 patents2 OECD EU
Australia 7.23 36.85 -7.10 2,253 1 0
Austria 6.17 79.28 -5.34 1,676 1 1
Belgium 18.15 134.61 -5.28 2,102 1 1
Canada 14.80 70.53 -6.17 10,667 1 0
Czech Republic 11.86 104.66 11.19 21 0 1
Denmark 7.32 67.18 -5.20 1,177 1 1
Estonia 32.58 132.03 24.89 3 0 1
Finland 7.40 64.57 -9.48 1,859 1 1
France 8.32 44.45 -5.91 14,255 1 1
Germany 7.39 51.22 -5.78 34,050 1 1
Greece 10.47 44.22 -3.78 60 0 1
Hungary 14.48 84.25 2.30 225 0 1
Ireland 5.33 138.87 -2.98 304 1 1
Israel 27.38 75.31 -0.59 2,066 0 0
Italy 6.58 45.88 -7.40 6,017 1 1
Japan 5.91 17.95 2.69 112,673 1 0
Mexico 7.56 58.07 5.10 213 0 0
Netherlands 9.93 107.21 -5.08 4,056 1 1
New Zealand 8.30 55.02 -7.46 257 1 0
Poland 8.08 46.73 14.43 60 0 1
Portugal 17.92 64.36 -2.60 22 1 1
Slovakia 17.41 117.72 0.27 4 0 1
Spain 6.82 44.97 -7.68 681 1 1
Sweden 13.37 70.82 -7.28 n.a. 1 1
Switzerland 10.22 68.51 -5.33 5,557 1 0
Turkey 14.66 46.34 -6.80 12 0 0
United Kingdom 7.66 57.80 -1.95 12,138 1 1
United States 12.01 23.01 0.00 287,848 1 0
Source: Heston et al. (2002)(1), US Department of Commerce (2005)(2)
z1 = Government Consumption
(“Government share of Real Gross Domestic Price Level between 1990 and 2000”)
z2 = Openness
(“Exports plus imports divided by Real Gross Domestic Price Level between 1990 and 2000”)
z3 = Inflation
[Rate of inflation between 1990 and 2000 with United States = 0]
z4 = Patents
(“Number of patents for invention for country of origin granted by the US Department of Commerce between 1993 and
1997”)
z5 = OECD
(“Did the country belong to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 2008?”)
[0 = no; 1 = yes]
z6 = EU
(“Did the country belong to the European Union in 2008?”)
[0 = no; 1 = yes]
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Table A.3.2 - Socio-Economic Variables: Developing Countries (Control Variables)
Country
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6
CTRL CTRL CTRL CTRL CTRL CTRL
govtcons1 openness1 inflation1 patents2 OECD EU
Albania 23.99 45.20 13.51 0 0 0
Argentina 14.50 20.29 -1.60 152 0 0
Armenia 33.64 113.53 61.83 1 0 0
Bangladesh 10.54 25.73 -5.94 0 0 0
Benin 12.15 63.83 -10.98 n.a. 0 0
Bolivia 18.21 47.91 0.28 1 0 0
Brazil 24.69 15.03 -5.91 305 0 0
Bulgaria 34.69 105.93 22.87 16 0 0
Chad 25.23 48.94 -15.36 0 0 0
China 25.28 38.75 -0.51 271 0 0
Colombia 19.57 30.28 1.69 n.a. 0 0
Costa Rica 21.18 89.76 11.81 14 0 0
Croatia 34.87 90.68 -6.64 23 0 0
Cyprus 22.30 99.01 0.96 9 0 1
Dominican Republic 19.76 66.05 0.81 2 0 0
Ecuador 21.16 51.34 -1.89 3 0 0
Egypt 10.11 45.96 -6.13 12 0 0
El Salvador 16.68 54.88 7.03 2 0 0
Guatemala 14.11 42.35 8.93 7 0 0
Guyana 32.56 203.64 -5.69 0 0 0
Honduras 16.74 96.77 6.77 2 0 0
Indonesia 19.02 48.54 -10.74 23 0 0
Jamaica 24.70 113.31 11.33 3 0 0
Kazakhstan 22.95 67.86 6.75 2 0 0
Latvia 26.98 98.92 132.99 0 0 1
Lithuania 27.87 117.23 49.87 3 0 1
Madagascar 13.28 46.46 -5.39 0 0 0
Malaysia 18.66 162.34 -1.48 59 0 0
Mali 20.87 57.25 -17.75 0 0 0
Mauritania 27.73 96.50 -15.66 0 0 0
Moldova 33.79 113.06 -2.08 0 0 0
Morocco 16.78 49.01 -7.73 4 0 0
Mozambique 28.03 52.17 -2.57 n.a. 0 0
Nepal 23.17 50.36 -9.67 n.a. 0 0
Nicaragua 32.60 103.89 16.05 1 0 0
Nigeria 13.22 70.06 3.83 3 0 0
Paraguay 19.59 84.81 -0.45 0 0 0
Peru 12.92 26.60 -5.00 10 0 0
Phillipines 16.79 75.06 -2.68 17 0 0
Senegal 17.27 76.85 -17.68 0 0 0
Singapore 7.41 313.93 0.05 324 0 0
South Africa 25.87 43.15 -6.13 529 0 0
Taiwan 14.45 91.05 -3.84 8206 0 0
Tajikistan 21.96 144.37 -15.94 n.a. 0 0
Tanzania 23.08 49.44 13.46 0 0 0
Thailand 14.12 83.72 -6.01 34 0 0
Uganda 27.38 32.11 -7.90 3 0 0
Venezuela 15.40 58.22 15.62 133 0 0
Vietnam 18.52 74.50 25.23 0 0 0
Zambia 24.55 76.12 -6.32 0 0 0
Zimbawe 18.73 73.62 -14.25 6 0 0
Source: Heston et al. (2002)(1), US Department of Commerce (2005)(2)
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Table A.4.1 - Socio-Economic Variables: Developed Countries (Instrumental Variables)
Country
iv1 iv2 iv3
britishcolony1 agedemregime2 ethnic−linguistic3
Australia 1 111 0.093
Austria 0 79 0.107
Belgium 0 154 0.555
Canada 1 145 0.712
Czech Republic 0 46 0.322
Denmark 0 93 0.082
Estonia 0 36 0.506
Finland 0 95 0.132
France 0 119 0.103
Germany 0 63 0.168
Greece 0 122 0.158
Hungary 0 22 0.152
Ireland 1 91 0.121
Israel 1 64 0.344
Italy 0 64 0.115
Japan 0 60 0.012
Mexico 0 12 0.542
Netherlands 0 91 0.105
New Zealand 1 155 0.397
Poland 0 30 0.118
Portugal 0 52 0.047
Slovakia 0 19 0.254
Spain 0 44 0.417
Sweden 0 95 0.060
Switzerland 0 164 0.531
Turkey 0 55 0.320
United Kingdom 1 132 0.121
United States 1 212 0.490
Source: Heston et al. (2002)(1), Keefer et al. (2013)(2), Alesina et al. (2003)(3)
Indicators
iv1 = British Colony
(“Was the country a British colony?”)
[0 = no; 1 = yes]
iv2 = Age of Democratic Regime
(“Number of consecutive years a democratic regime has been established in the country”)
iv3 = Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization
[0 = mininum fractionalization; 1 = maximum fractionalization]
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Table A.4.2 - Socio-Economic Variables: Developing Countries (Instrumental Variables)
Country
iv1 iv2 iv3
britishcolony1 agedemregime2 ethnic−linguistic3
Albania 0 10 0.220
Argentina 0 29 0.339
Armenia 0 4 0.127
Bangladesh 1 0 0.045
Benin 0 154 0.787
Bolivia 0 30 0.740
Brazil 0 28 0.541
Bulgaria 0 22 0.402
Chad 0 0 0.862
China 0 0 0.154
Colombia 0 75 0.601
Costa Rica 0 183 0.237
Croatia 0 12 0.369
Cyprus 1 48 0.094
Dominican Republic 0 17 0.429
Ecuador 0 22 0.655
Egypt 0 6 0.184
El Salvador 0 21 0.198
Guatemala 0 16 0.512
Guyana 1 0 0.620
Honduras 0 13 0.187
Indonesia 0 13 0.735
Jamaica 1 53 0.413
Kazakhstan 0 0 0.617
Latvia 0 36 0.587
Lithuania 0 29 0.322
Madagascar 0 17 0.879
Malaysia 1 12 0.588
Mali 0 14 0.691
Mauritania 0 0 0.615
Moldova 0 19 0.554
Morocco 0 0 0.484
Mozambique 0 0 0.693
Nepal 1 6 0.663
Nicaragua 0 17 0.484
Nigeria 1 11 0.851
Paraguay 0 20 0.169
Peru 0 24 0.657
Phillipines 0 25 0.239
Senegal 0 12 0.694
Singapore 1 4 0.386
South Africa 1 101 0.752
Taiwan 0 20 0.274
Tajikistan 0 0 0.511
Tanzania 1 0 0.735
Thailand 1 16 0.634
Uganda 1 4 0.930
Venezuela 0 43 0.497
Vietnam 0 0 0.238
Zambia 1 5 0.781
Zimbawe 1 9 0.387
Source: Heston et al. (2002)(1), Keefer et al. (2013)(2), Alesina et al. (2003)(3)
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Appendix B - Descriptive Statistics
Table B.1.1 - Competition Policy Indicators : Developed Countries
Independent Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
x1 - COMPlaw 28 0.461 0.157 0.173 0.750
x2 - COMPeconomics 28 0.692 0.192 0.233 0.972
x3 - COMPdejure 28 0.531 0.088 0.331 0.692
x4 - COMPdefacto 28 0.798 0.178 0.372 1
Table B.1.2 - Competition Policy Indicators : Developing Countries
Independent Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
x1 - COMPlaw 51 0.207 0.233 0 0.702
x2 - COMPeconomics 44 0.284 0.322 0 0.810
x3 - COMPdejure 46 0.275 0.269 0 0.769
x4 - COMPdefacto 41 0.349 0.365 0 0.902
Table B.2.1 - Performance Indicators : Developed Countries
Dependent Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
y1 - PERF local 28 5.580 0.411 4.623 6.315
y2 - PERF dominance 28 4.974 0.795 3.301 6.207
y3 - PERF antitrust 28 5.200 0.688 3.623 6.123
y4 - PERF comp 28 4.921 0.413 4.130 5.422
y5 - PERF efficiency 28 4.971 0.449 4.123 5.431
Table B.2.2 - Performance Indicators : Developing Countries
Dependent Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
y1 - PERF local 50 4.590 0.647 3.215 5.797
y2 - PERF dominance 50 3.522 0.754 2.474 5.605
y3 - PERF antitrust 50 3.630 0.740 2.518 5.398
y4 - PERF comp 50 4.021 0.556 3.022 5.931
y5 - PERF efficiency 50 3.994 0.574 2.843 5.762
Table B.3.1 - Socio-Economic Variables: Developed Countries
Control Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
z1 - CTRLgovtcons 28 11.618 6.472 5.330 32.579
z2 - CTRLopenness 28 69.729 32.506 17.953 138.871
z3 - CTRLinflation 28 -1.725 7.686 -9.477 24.889
z4 - CTRLpatents 27 18,528 58,182 3 287,848
z5 - CTRLOECD 27 0.667 0.4804 0 1
z6 - CTRLEU 26 0.692 0.4707 0 1
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Table B.3.2 - Socio-Economic Variables: Developing Countries
Control Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
z1 - CTRLgovtcons 51 21.170 6.812 7.414 34.868
z2 - CTRLopenness 51 77.379 49.859 15.029 313.927
z3 - CTRLinflation 51 3.760 23.757 -17.753 132.993
z4 - CTRLpatents 46 221.304 1208.163 0 8206
z5 - CTRLOECD 47 0 0 0 0
z6 - CTRLEU 50 0.06 0.240 0 1
Table B.4.1 - Socio-Economic Variables: Developed Countries
Instrumental Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
iv1 - IV britishcolony 28 0.25 0.441 0 1
iv2 - IV agedemregime 28 86.61 50.04 12 212
iv3 - IV ethnic−linguistic 28 0.253 0.194 0.012 0.712
Table B.4.2 - Socio-Economic Variables: Developing Countries
Instrumental Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
iv1 - IV britishcolony 51 0.275 0.451 0 1
iv2 - IV agedemregime 51 23.529 35.492 0 183
iv3 - IV ethnic−linguistic 51 0.491 0.233 0.045 0.930
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Appendix C.1 - Estimation (Developing and Developed Countries)
Table C.1.1.1 - OLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators without/with Control Variables
(Substantive Content of the Competition Law as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competiton competiton efficiency efficiency
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
COMPlaw 1.331
∗∗∗ 0.431 1.594∗∗∗ 0.245 1.785∗∗∗ 0.457 0.858∗∗ 0.066 1.123∗∗∗ 0.234
(0.316) (0.330) (0.454) (0.404) (0.448) (0.427) (0.299) (0.263) (0.309) (0.273)
CTRLgovtcons -0.020 -0.033
∗ -0.011 -0.021∗ -0.024∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
CTRLopenness 0.003 0.005
∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLOECD 0.356 1.017
∗∗∗ 1.139∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.278) (0.294) (0.181) (0.188)
CTRLEU 0.369 0.315 0.488
∗ 0.133 0.068
(0.185) (0.226) (0.239) (0.147) (0.153)
costant 4.550∗∗∗ 4.791∗∗∗ 3.570∗∗∗ 3.854∗∗∗ 3.664∗∗∗ 3.540∗∗∗ 4.089∗∗∗ 4.070∗∗∗ 4.011∗∗∗ 4.094∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.266) (0.174) (0.324) (0.171) (0.344) (0.115) (0.212) (0.118) (0.220)
R2 0.189 0.458 0.140 0.622 0.173 0.585 0.098 0.589 0.148 0.608
SER 0.675 0.550 0.968 0.671 0.955 0.711 0.638 0.438 0.659 0.455
N 78 69 78 69 78 69 78 69 78 69
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
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Table C.1.1.2 - OLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators without/with Control Variables
(Degree the Competition Law incorporates an Economic Approach as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competiton competiton efficiency efficiency
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
COMPeconomics 1.068
∗∗∗ 0.604∗ 1.483∗∗∗ 0.825∗ 1.725∗∗∗ 1.176∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.536∗ 0.988∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗
(0.235) (0.287) (0.321) (0.331) (0.299) (0.322) (0.217) (0.210) (0.225) (0.218)
CTRLgovtcons -0.020 -0.037
∗∗ -0.016 -0.0223∗∗ -0.025∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
CTRLopenness 0.004
∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLOECD 0.368 0.913
∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.257) (0.250) (0.163) (0.169)
CTRLEU 0.171 -0.030 0.0220 -0.077 -0.172
(0.215) (0.248) (0.241) (0.158) (0.164)
costant 4.490∗∗∗ 4.656∗∗∗ 3.444∗∗∗ 3.701∗∗∗ 3.483∗∗∗ 3.322∗∗∗ 4.001∗∗∗ 3.881∗∗∗ 3.926∗∗∗ 3.900∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.281) (0.179) (0.324) (0.167) (0.315) (0.121) (0.206) (0.125) (0.214)
R2 0.228 0.492 0.233 0.671 0.322 0.685 0.170 0.666 0.216 0.686
SER 0.677 0.549 0.925 0.634 0.862 0.617 0.625 0.403 0.647 0.418
N 72 63 72 63 72 63 72 63 72 63
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
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Table C.1.1.3 - OLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators without/with Control Variables
(Formal Independence of the Competition Authority as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competiton competiton efficiency efficiency
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
COMPdejure 1.452
∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗ 1.907∗∗∗ 1.264∗∗ 2.334∗∗∗ 1.806∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 1.324∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.314) (0.434) (0.375) (0.400) (0.360) (0.289) (0.240) (0.298) (0.244)
CTRLgovtcons -0.021 -0.036
∗∗ -0.015 -0.022∗ -0.025∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
CTRLopenness 0.004
∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 -0.001 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000
∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLOECD 0.297 0.862
∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.253) (0.243) (0.162) (0.165)
CTRLEU 0.218 0.078 0.159 -0.019 -0.098
(0.184) (0.219) (0.210) (0.140) (0.143)
costant 4.425∗∗∗ 4.549∗∗∗ 3.381∗∗∗ 3.543∗∗∗ 3.385∗∗∗ 3.131∗∗∗ 3.960∗∗∗ 3.778∗∗∗ 3.874∗∗∗ 3.801∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.265) (0.194) (0.316) (0.179) (0.303) (0.129) (0.202) (0.133) (0.206)
R2 0.234 0.526 0.212 0.679 0.321 0.702 0.166 0.667 0.215 0.697
SER 0.665 0.521 0.932 0.622 0.860 0.597 0.620 0.626 0.640 0.405
N 74 65 74 65 74 65 74 65 74 65
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
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Table C.1.1.4 - OLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators without/with Control Variables
(Factual Independence of the Competition Authority as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competiton competiton efficiency efficiency
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
COMPdefacto 1.163
∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 1.568∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 1.818∗∗∗ 1.376∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.226) (0.288) (0.272) (0.259) (0.267) (0.200) (0.182) (0.203) (0.181)
CTRLgovtcons -0.021 -0.033
∗ -0.015 -0.022∗ -0.024∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
CTRLopenness 0.004
∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
CTRLpatents 0.000
∗ 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLOECD 0.205 0.792
∗∗ 0.737∗∗ 0.443∗ 0.542∗∗
(0.225) (0.270) (0.265) (0.182) (0.181)
CTRLEU 0.202 0.078 0.123 -0.017 -0.100
(0.184) (0.222) (0.218) (0.149) (0.148)
costant 4.340∗∗∗ 4.448∗∗∗ 3.286∗∗∗ 3.487∗∗∗ 3.326∗∗∗ 3.145∗∗∗ 3.914∗∗∗ 3.780∗∗∗ 3.811∗∗∗ 3.765∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.264) (0.185) (0.317) (0.167) (0.311) (0.129) (0.213) (0.131) (0.212)
R2 0.329 0.574 0.313 0.698 0.431 0.706 0.225 0.665 0.295 0.708
SER 0.629 0.512 0.880 0.615 0.791 0.604 0.612 0.413 0.620 0.411
N 67 59 67 59 67 59 67 59 67 59
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
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Table C.1.2.1 - 2SLS and GMM Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators with Control Variables
(Substantive Content of the Competition Law as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competition competition efficiency efficiency
Technique 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
COMPlaw 1.319 1.411 1.770 2.033 1.448 1.285 0.293 -0.065 0.980 0.806
(0.949) (0.816) (1.218) (1.065) (1.211) (0.796) (0.720) (0.495) (0.787) (0.523)
CTRLgovtcons -0.019 -0.022
∗ -0.032∗ -0.031∗ -0.010 -0.024∗ -0.021∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.023∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
CTRLopenness 0.004
∗ 0.003∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.004 -0.003 -0.007
∗∗ -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 0.0002 0.002 -0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLOECD 0.185 0.210 0.722
∗ 0.764∗ 0.948∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.577∗ 0.622∗∗∗
(0.284) (0.227) (0.364) (0.315) (0.362) (0.255) (0.215) (0.174) (0.235) (0.163)
CTRLEU 0.303 0.271 0.201 0.172 0.414 0.429
∗ 0.116 0.191 0.012 0.008
(0.195) (0.169) (0.251) (0.223) (0.249) (0.197) (0.148) (0.130) (0.162) (0.133)
costant 4.515∗∗∗ 4.562∗∗∗ 3.380∗∗∗ 3.276∗∗∗ 3.231∗∗∗ 3.422∗∗∗ 4.000∗∗∗ 4.200∗∗∗ 3.862∗∗∗ 4.020∗∗∗
(0.383) (0.305) (0.491) (0.407) (0.488) (0.332) (0.290) (0.202) (0.317) (0.200)
R2 0.394 0.377 0.534 0.499 0.549 0.545 0.583 0.580 0.561 0.574
SER 0.546 0.554 0.701 0.727 0.697 0.700 0.414 0.416 0.453 0.446
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Instrumental Variables: British Colony, Age of Democratic Regime, Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization.
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Table C.1.2.2 - 2SLS and GMM Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators with Control Variables
(Degree the Competition Law incorporates an Economic Approach as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competition competition efficiency efficiency
Technique 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
COMPeconomics 2.265 2.434
∗∗ 2.857 2.732∗ 3.734∗ 4.053∗ 1.486 1.778∗ 2.105 2.398∗∗
(1.407) (0.887) (1.660) (1.107) (1.824) (1.730) (0.952) (0.843) (1.132) (0.875)
CTRLgovtcons -0.017 -0.016 -0.034
∗ -0.029 -0.012 0.014 -0.021∗ -0.021 -0.023∗ -0.022
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
CTRLopenness 0.006
∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CTRLinflation -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009
∗ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗ 6.14E-08 5.19E-08 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLOECD 0.159 0.153 0.657 0.727
∗∗∗ 0.710 0.648 0.435∗ 0.324 0.497∗ 0.451∗
(0.315) (0.210) (0.371) (0.270) (0.408) (0.364) (0.213) (0.178) (0.253) (0.213)
CTRLEU -0.463 -0.498 -0.805 -0.788 -0.953 -1.020 -0.439 -0.485 -0.724 -0.791
(0.579) (0.425) (0.684) (0.475) (0.751) (0.798) (0.392) (0.402) (0.466) (0.411)
costant 3.964∗∗∗ 3.843∗∗∗ 2.855∗∗∗ 2.815∗∗∗ 2.257∗∗ 2.154∗ 3.485∗∗∗ 3.383∗∗∗ 3.297∗∗∗ 3.151∗∗∗
(0.659) (0.469) (0.778) (0.620) (0.854) (0.853) (0.446) (0.420) (0.530) (0.464)
R2 0.183 0.116 0.446 0.472 0.324 0.227 0.543 0.451 0.436 0.323
SER 0.651 0.677 0.769 0.751 0.844 0.903 0.441 0.483 0.524 0.574
N 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Instrumental Variables: British Colony, Age of Democratic Regime, Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization.
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Table C.1.2.3 - 2SLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators with Control Variables
(Formal Independence of the Competition Authority as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competition competition efficiency efficiency
Technique 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
COMPdejure 2.335
∗ 2.445 2.678∗ 2.636 4.689∗∗ 4.710 2.289∗ 2.404 2.586∗∗ 2.511
(1.111) (0.825) (1.295) (0.975) (1.622) (1.480) (0.945) (0.878) (0.994) (0.765)
CTRLgovtcons -0.023 -0.023 -0.038
∗∗ -0.035 -0.019 -0.021 -0.024∗ -0.026 -0.027∗∗ -0.029
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
CTRLopenness 0.005
∗ 0.006 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009 0.010∗∗ 0.010 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CTRLinflation -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.014
∗ -0.014 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLOECD 0.115 0.096 0.666
∗ 0.665 0.539 0.519 0.310 0.281 0.405 0.418
(0.271) (0.214) (0.315) (0.253) (0.395) (0.329) (0.230) (0.191) (0.242) (0.179)
CTRLEU -0.013 -0.003 -0.170 -0.144 -0.346 -0.364 -0.270 -0.311 -0.375 -0.370
(0.270) (0.174) (0.315) (0.256) (0.395) (0.318) (0.230) (0.201) (0.242) (0.181)
costant 4.077∗∗∗ 4.008 3.037∗∗∗ 2.972 2.100∗∗ 2.131 3.265∗∗∗ 3.276 3.237∗∗∗ 3.287
(0.473) (0.389) (0.551) (0.496) (0.690) (0.654) (0.402) (0.401) (0.423) (0.372)
R2 0.380 0.354 0.599 0.603 0.367 0.361 0.458 0.495 0.475 0.495
SER 0.558 0.570 0.651 0.648 0.815 0.818 0.475 0.490 0.500 0.490
N 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Instrumental Variables: British Colony, Age of Democratic Regime, Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization.
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Table C.1.2.4 - 2SLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators with Control Variables
(Factual Independence of the Competition Authority as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competition competition efficiency efficiency
Technique 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
COMPdefacto 1.880
∗ 1.999∗∗∗ 1.845∗ 1.823∗∗ 3.069∗∗ 3.292∗∗ 1.485∗ 1.747∗ 1.813∗ 1.994∗∗
(0.825) (0.567) (0.919) (0.660) (1.098) (1.206) (0.675) (0.751) (0.718) (0.702)
CTRLgovtcons -0.023 -0.025
∗ -0.036∗∗ -0.031∗ -0.019 -0.018 -0.024∗ -0.0260∗ -0.027∗ -0.029∗
(0.0122) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
CTRLopenness 0.006
∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CTRLinflation -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0006
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CTRLpatents 0.000
∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLOECD -0.141 -0.179 0.496 0.566
∗ 0.171 0.147 0.152 0.046 0.191 0.136
(0.362) (0.260) (0.403) (0.279) (0.481) (0.474) (0.296) (0.284) (0.315) (0.290)
CTRLEU -0.070 -0.099 -0.155 -0.165 -0.323 -0.358 -0.246 -0.290 -0.377 -0.409
(0.291) (0.223) (0.323) (0.227) (0.386) (0.403) (0.238) (0.276) (0.253) (0.255)
costant 3.977∗∗∗ 3.940∗∗∗ 3.084∗∗∗ 2.980∗∗∗ 2.373∗∗∗ 2.197∗∗ 3.383∗∗∗ 3.276∗∗∗ 3.286∗∗∗ 3.202∗∗∗
(0.462) (0.356) (0.514) (0.474) (0.614) (0.672) (0.378) (0.432) (0.402) (0.407)
R2 0.400 0.357 0.635 0.636 0.473 0.406 0.515 0.410 0.517 0.444
SER 0.565 0.585 0.629 0.628 0.751 0.798 0.462 0.510 0.492 0.528
N 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Instrumental Variables: British Colony, Age of Democratic Regime, Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization.
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Table C.1.3.1 - OLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators without/with Control Variables
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competiton competiton efficiency efficiency
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
COMPlaw 1.331
∗∗∗ 0.431 1.594∗∗∗ 0.245 1.785∗∗∗ 0.457 0.858∗∗ 0.066 1.123∗∗∗ 0.234
(0.316) (0.330) (0.454) (0.404) (0.448) (0.427) (0.299) (0.263) (0.309) (0.273)
R2 0.189 0.458 0.140 0.622 0.173 0.585 0.098 0.589 0.148 0.608
SER 0.675 0.550 0.968 0.671 0.955 0.711 0.638 0.438 0.659 0.455
N 78 69 78 69 78 69 78 69 78 69
COMPeconomics 1.068
∗∗∗ 0.604∗ 1.483∗∗∗ 0.825∗ 1.725∗∗∗ 1.176∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.536∗ 0.988∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗
(0.235) (0.287) (0.321) (0.331) (0.299) (0.322) (0.217) (0.210) (0.225) (0.218)
R2 0.228 0.492 0.233 0.671 0.322 0.685 0.170 0.666 0.216 0.686
SER 0.677 0.549 0.925 0.634 0.862 0.617 0.625 0.403 0.647 0.418
N 72 63 72 63 72 63 72 63 72 63
COMPdejure 1.452
∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗ 1.907∗∗∗ 1.264∗∗ 2.334∗∗∗ 1.806∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 1.324∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.314) (0.434) (0.375) (0.400) (0.360) (0.289) (0.240) (0.298) (0.244)
R2 0.234 0.526 0.212 0.679 0.321 0.702 0.166 0.667 0.215 0.697
SER 0.665 0.521 0.932 0.622 0.860 0.597 0.620 0.626 0.640 0.405
N 74 65 74 65 74 65 74 65 74 65
COMPdefacto 1.163
∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 1.568∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 1.818∗∗∗ 1.376∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.226) (0.288) (0.272) (0.259) (0.267) (0.200) (0.182) (0.203) (0.181)
R2 0.329 0.574 0.313 0.698 0.431 0.706 0.225 0.665 0.295 0.708
SER 0.629 0.512 0.880 0.615 0.791 0.604 0.612 0.413 0.620 0.411
N 67 59 67 59 67 59 67 59 67 59
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Control Variables: Government Consumption, Openness, Inflation, Patents, OECD, EU.
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Table C.1.3.2 - 2SLS and GMM Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators with Control and Instrumental Variables
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competition competition efficiency efficiency
Technique 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS* GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
COMPlaw 1.319 1.411 1.770 2.033 1.448 1.285 0.293 -0.065 0.980 0.806
(0.949) (0.816) (1.218) (1.065) (1.211) (0.796) (0.720) (0.495) (0.787) (0.523)
R2 0.394 0.377 0.534 0.499 0.549 0.545 0.583 0.580 0.561 0.574
SER 0.546 0.554 0.701 0.727 0.697 0.700 0.414 0.416 0.453 0.446
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
COMPeconomics 2.265 2.434
∗∗ 2.857 2.732∗ 3.734∗ 4.053∗ 1.486 1.778∗ 2.105 2.398∗∗
(1.407) (0.887) (1.660) (1.107) (1.824) (1.730) (0.952) (0.843) (1.132) (0.875)
R2 0.1828 0.116 0.4460 0.472 0.3241 0.227 0.543 0.451 0.436 0.323
SER 0.65129 0.677 0.76881 0.751 0.84442 0.903 0.441 0.483 0.524 0.574
N 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
COMPdejure 2.335
∗ 2.445 2.678∗ 2.636 4.689∗∗ 4.710 2.289∗ 2.404 2.586∗∗ 2.511
(1.111) (0.825) (1.295) (0.975) (1.622) (1.480) (0.945) (0.878) (0.994) (0.765)
R2 0.380 0.354 0.599 0.603 0.367 0.361 0.458 0.495 0.475 0.495
SER 0.558 0.570 0.651 0.648 0.815 0.818 0.475 0.490 0.500 0.490
N 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
COMPdefacto 1.880
∗ 1.999∗∗∗ 1.845∗ 1.823∗∗ 3.069∗∗ 3.292∗∗ 1.485∗ 1.747∗ 1.813∗ 1.994∗∗
(0.825) (0.567) (0.919) (0.660) (1.098) (1.206) (0.675) (0.751) (0.718) (0.702)
R2 0.400 0.357 0.635 0.636 0.473 0.406 0.515 0.410 0.517 0.444
SER 0.565 0.585 0.629 0.628 0.751 0.798 0.462 0.510 0.492 0.528
N 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Control Variables: Government Consumption, Openness, Inflation, Patents, OECD, EU.
Instrumental Variables: British Colony, Age of Democratic Regime, Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization.
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Appendix C.2 - Estimation (Developing Countries)
Table C.2.1.1 - OLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators without/with Control Variables
(Substantive Content of the Competition Law as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competiton competiton efficiency efficiency
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
COMPlaw 0.538 0.389 0.006 0.074 0.273 0.341 -0.168 -0.236 0.174 0.120
(0.390) (0.416) (0.464) (0.489) (0.453) (0.516) (0.341) (0.314) (0.352) (0.334)
CTRLgovtcons -0.029 -0.033 -0.017 -0.027
∗ -0.031∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012)
CTRLopenness 0.002 0.004
∗ 0.004 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.004 -0.004 -0.009 0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000
∗∗ 0.0002 0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLEU 0.916
∗ 0.723 1.241∗ 0.510 0.561
(0.344) (0.511) (0.539) (0.328) (0.349)
costant 4.480∗∗∗ 4.935∗∗∗ 3.521∗∗∗ 3.846∗∗∗ 3.574∗∗∗ 3.550∗∗∗ 4.055∗∗∗ 4.210∗∗∗ 3.959∗∗∗ 4.199∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.344) (0.144) (0.404) (0.140) (0.427) (0.106) (0.260) (0.109) (0.277)
R2 0.038 0.299 0.000 0.370 0.008 0.295 0.005 0.495 0.005 0.469
SER 0.641 0.573 0.762 0.673 0.745 0.711 0.561 0.433 0.579 0.461
JB
N 50 42 50 42 50 42 50 42 50 42
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
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Table C.2.1.2 - OLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators without/with Control Variables
(Degree the Competition Law incorporates an Economic Approach as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competiton competiton efficiency efficiency
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
COMPeconomics 0.321 0.382 0.320 0.758 0.677
∗ 1.108∗∗ 0.094 0.405 0.279 0.583∗
(0.319) (0.392) (0.370) (0.422) (0.329) (0.384) (0.274) (0.259) (0.281) (0.274)
CTRLgovtcons -0.029 -0.042
∗ -0.028 -0.031∗∗ -0.034∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011)
CTRLopenness 0.003 0.006
∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000
∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLEU 0.729 0.278 0.605 0.310 0.267
(0.500) (0.537) (0.489) (0.330) (0.349)
costant 4.477∗∗∗ 4.859∗∗∗ 3.453∗∗∗ 3.789∗∗∗ 3.448∗∗∗ 3.469∗∗∗ 3.982∗∗∗ 4.033∗∗∗ 3.898∗∗∗ 4.039∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.384) (0.158) (0.413) (0.140) (0.377) (0.117) (0.254) (0.120) (0.268)
R2 0.024 0.329 0.018 0.477 0.092 0.510 0.003 0.619 0.023 0.610
SER 0.673 0.599 0.780 0.645 0.693 0.587 0.578 0.396 0.593 0.419
JB
N 44 36 44 36 44 36 44 36 44 36
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
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Table C.2.1.3 - OLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators without/with Control Variables
(Formal Independence of the Competition Authority as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competiton competiton efficiency efficiency
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
COMPdejure 0.708 0.818 0.774 1.116 1.236
∗∗ 1.664 0.347 0.649 0.580 0.839∗∗
(0.357) (0.384) (0.418) (0.429) (0.376) (0.396) (0.315) (0.278) (0.319) (0.285)
CTRLgovtcons -0.031 -0.041 -0.028 -0.029 -0.034
∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011)
CTRLopenness 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.006
∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.005 -0.006 -0.011 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLEU 0.802 0.519 0.939 0.428 0.445
(0.433) (0.485) (0.448) (0.314) (0.322)
costant 4.395∗∗∗ 4.801 3.339∗∗∗ 3.687∗∗∗ 3.337∗∗∗ 3.367 3.932∗∗∗ 3.971 3.839∗∗∗ 4.006∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.350) (0.160) (0.391) (0.144) (0.361) (0.121) (0.254) (0.122) (0.260)
R2 0.082 0.378 0.072 0.488 0.197 0.547 0.027 0.583 0.070 0.597
SER 0.645 0.564 0.755 0.630 0.678 0.582 0.569 0.409 0.576 0.418
JB
N 46 38 46 38 46 38 46 38 46 38
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
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Table C.2.1.4 - OLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators without/with Control Variables
(Factual Independence of the Competition Authority as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competiton competiton efficiency efficiency
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
COMPdefacto 0.601
∗ 0.641∗ 0.648 0.843∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 1.362∗∗∗ 0.277 0.483∗ 0.474 0.664∗∗
(0.274) (0.298) (0.337) (0.355) (0.294) (0.318) (0.257) (0.228) (0.257) (0.228)
CTRLgovtcons -0.033
∗ -0.045∗ -0.034∗ -0.031∗ -0.036∗∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
CTRLopenness 0.003 0.006
∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0014) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.0002 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLEU 0.669 0.329 0.656 0.339 0.315
(0.441) (0.524) (0.470) (0.338) (0.337)
costant 4.343∗∗∗ 4.741∗∗∗ 3.327∗∗∗ 3.776∗∗∗ 3.327∗∗∗ 3.480∗∗∗ 3.923∗∗∗ 3.990∗∗∗ 3.818∗∗∗ 4.004∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.351) (0.169) (0.416) (0.147) (0.374) (0.129) (0.268) (0.129) (0.267)
R2 0.110 0.427 0.087 0.497 0.256 0.584 0.029 0.598 0.080 0.629
SER 0.632 0.556 0.777 0.660 0.678 0.592 0.591 0.425 0.593 0.424
JB
N 41 34 41 34 41 34 41 34 41 34
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
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Table C.2.2.1 - 2SLS and GMM Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators with Control Variables
(Substantive Content of the Competition Law as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competition competition efficiency efficiency
Technique 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
COMPlaw 0.740 0.729 0.560 -0.114 -0.396 -0.482 -0.770 -0.861 0.025 -0.169
(1.028) (0.995) (1.211) (1.195) (1.297) (0.890) (0.799) (0.551) (0.818) (0.645)
CTRLgovtcons -0.029
∗ -0.030∗ -0.034∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.016 -0.032∗∗ -0.027∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
CTRLopenness 0.002 0.002 0.005
∗ 0.004∗ 0.003 0.004∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000
∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLEU 0.922
∗ 1.007∗∗∗ 0.733 0.680∗∗∗ 1.227∗ 1.288∗∗∗ 0.500 0.540∗∗∗ 0.559 0.592∗∗∗
(0.401) (0.207) (0.473) (0.196) (0.507) (0.155) (0.312) (0.153) (0.320) (0.088)
costant 4.849∗∗∗ 4.892∗∗∗ 3.727∗∗∗ 3.944∗∗∗ 3.730∗∗∗ 3.930∗∗∗ 4.340∗∗∗ 4.395∗∗∗ 4.222∗∗∗ 4.335∗∗∗
(0.394) (0.284) (0.464) (0.411) (0.497) (0.350) (0.306) (0.256) (0.314) (0.237)
R2 0.284 0.283 0.352 0.363 0.254 0.209 0.454 0.437 0.468 0.456
SER 0.529 0.529 0.623 0.618 0.667 0.687 0.411 0.417 0.421 0.426
JB
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Instrumental Variables: British Colony, Age of Democratic Regime, Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization.
(Note: the control variable OECD is omitted since there is no developing country belonging to the OECD, i.e. it’s value is 0 for all the developing countries)
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Table C.2.2.2 - 2SLS and GMM Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators with Control Variables
(Degree the Competition Law incorporates an Economic Approach as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competition competition efficiency efficiency
Technique 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
COMPeconomics 1.972 2.004 2.624 2.463
∗ 2.383 2.407∗ -0.088 -0.138 0.872 0.883
(1.964) (1.034) (2.184) (1.167) (1.806) (1.130) (1.099) (0.676) (1.117) (0.668)
CTRLgovtcons -0.031 -0.032
∗ -0.044∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.030 -0.036∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.013) (0.020) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
CTRLopenness 0.005 0.005
∗ 0.008∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007
∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ 0.0001
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000
∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLEU -0.089 -0.062 -0.682 -0.688 -0.051 -0.053 0.564 0.610 0.118 0.110
(1.133) (0.601) (1.260) (0.633) (1.042) (0.647) (0.634) (0.420) (0.644) (0.402)
costant 4.365∗∗∗ 4.319∗∗∗ 3.210∗∗∗ 3.251∗∗∗ 3.073∗∗∗ 3.178∗∗∗ 4.186∗∗∗ 4.315∗∗∗ 3.949∗∗∗ 4.032∗∗∗
(0.735) (0.419) (0.817) (0.541) (0.675) (0.457) (0.411) (0.227) (0.418) (0.222)
R2 0.125 0.182 0.125 0.182 0.324 0.309 0.571 0.550 0.595 0.591
SER 0.749 0.724 0.749 0.724 0.619 0.626 0.377 0.386 0.383 0.385
JB
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Instrumental Variables: British Colony, Age of Democratic Regime, Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization.
(Note: the control variable OECD is omitted since there is no developing country belonging to the OECD, i.e. it’s value is 0 for all the developing countries)
46
Table C.2.2.3 - 2SLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators with Control Variables
(Formal Independence of the Competition Authority as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competition competition efficiency efficiency
Technique 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
COMPdejure 1.438 1.746
∗∗∗ 2.149∗ 2.127∗∗ 3.192∗∗ 3.097∗∗∗ 1.144 0.946 1.369∗ 1.296∗∗
(0.899) (0.466) (1.051) (0.675) (1.084) (0.892) (0.657) (0.604) (0.675) (0.453)
CTRLgovtcons -0.035
∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.037∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
CTRLopenness 0.004 0.004
∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.006 -0.008
∗ -0.008 -0.007 -0.014∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000
∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLEU 0.712 0.784
∗∗ 0.369 0.276 0.717 0.776∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.359 0.368 0.413∗
(0.425) (0.238) (0.497) (0.290) (0.513) (0.307) (0.310) (0.190) (0.319) (0.173)
costant 4.663∗∗∗ 4.589∗∗∗ 3.458∗∗∗ 3.429∗∗∗ 3.028∗∗∗ 3.108∗∗∗ 3.862 4.117∗∗∗ 3.889∗∗∗ 4.014∗∗∗
(0.376) (0.258) (0.440) (0.380) (0.454) (0.326) (0.275) (0.206) (0.283) (0.191)
R2 0.325 0.257 0.392 0.394 0.330 0.557 0.540 0.557 0.552 0.561
SER 0.530 0.557 0.620 0.619 0.640 0.380 0.387 0.380 0.398 0.395
JB
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Instrumental Variables: British Colony, Age of Democratic Regime, Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization.
(Note: the control variable OECD is omitted since there is no developing country belonging to the OECD, i.e. it’s value is 0 for all the developing countries)
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Table C.2.2.4 - 2SLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators with Control Variables
(Factual Independence of the Competition Authority as Independent Variable)
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competition competition efficiency efficiency
Technique 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
COMPdefacto 1.282
∗ 1.279∗∗∗ 1.458∗ 1.499∗∗∗ 2.087∗∗ 1.880∗ 0.826 0.620 1.040∗ 0.944∗
(0.618) (0.274) (0.715) (0.437) (0.665) (0.877) (0.455) (0.491) (0.457) (0.409)
CTRLgovtcons -0.040
∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.042∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
CTRLopenness 0.004
∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CTRLinflation -0.003 -0.003
∗∗ -0.004 -0.003 -0.009 -0.008∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
CTRLpatents 0.000 0.000
∗∗ 0.000 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CTRLEU 0.408 0.416 0.079 -0.037 0.360 0.446 0.199 0.232 0.162 0.193
(0.480) (0.238) (0.556) (0.268) (0.517) (0.442) (0.353) (0.258) (0.355) (0.223)
costant 4.605∗∗∗ 4.598∗∗∗ 3.646∗∗∗ 3.662∗∗∗ 3.327∗∗∗ 3.355∗∗∗ 3.918∗∗∗ 4.139∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗ 4.004∗∗∗
(0.357) (0.244) (0.413) (0.347) (0.384) (0.311) (0.263) (0.206) (0.264) (0.201)
R2 0.329 0.330 0.440 0.431 0.503 0.535 0.565 0.581 0.591 0.604
SER 0.536 0.536 0.620 0.625 0.576 0.558 0.394 0.387 0.396 0.390
JB
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Instrumental Variables: British Colony, Age of Democratic Regime, Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization.
(Note: the control variable OECD is omitted since there is no developing country belonging to the OECD, i.e. it’s value is 0 for all the developing countries)
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Table C.2.3.1 - OLS Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators without/with Controls Variables
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competiton competiton efficiency efficiency
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
COMPlaw 0.538 0.389 0.006 0.074 0.273 0.341 -0.168 -0.236 0.174 0.120
(0.390) (0.416) (0.464) (0.489) (0.453) (0.516) (0.341) (0.314) (0.352) (0.334)
R2 0.038 0.299 0.000 0.370 0.008 0.295 0.005 0.495 0.005 0.469
SER 0.641 0.573 0.762 0.673 0.745 0.711 0.561 0.433 0.579 0.461
N 50 42 50 42 50 42 50 42 50 42
COMPeconomics 0.321 0.382 0.320 0.758 0.677
∗ 1.108∗∗ 0.094 0.405 0.279 0.583∗
(0.319) (0.392) (0.370) (0.422) (0.329) (0.384) (0.274) (0.259) (0.281) (0.274)
R2 0.024 0.329 0.018 0.477 0.092 0.510 0.003 0.619 0.023 0.610
SER 0.673 0.599 0.780 0.645 0.693 0.587 0.578 0.396 0.593 0.419
N 44 36 44 36 44 36 44 36 44 36
COMPdejure 0.708 0.818 0.774 1.116 1.236
∗∗ 1.664 0.347 0.649 0.580 0.839∗∗
(0.357) (0.384) (0.418) (0.429) (0.376) (0.396) (0.315) (0.278) (0.319) (0.285)
R2 0.082 0.378 0.072 0.488 0.197 0.547 0.027 0.583 0.070 0.597
SER 0.645 0.564 0.755 0.630 0.678 0.582 0.569 0.409 0.576 0.418
N 46 38 46 38 46 38 46 38 46 38
COMPdefacto 0.601
∗ 0.641∗ 0.648 0.843∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 1.362∗∗∗ 0.277 0.483∗ 0.474 0.664∗∗
(0.274) (0.298) (0.337) (0.355) (0.294) (0.318) (0.257) (0.228) (0.257) (0.228)
R2 0.110 0.427 0.087 0.497 0.256 0.584 0.029 0.598 0.080 0.629
SER 0.632 0.556 0.777 0.660 0.678 0.592 0.591 0.425 0.593 0.424
N 41 34 41 34 41 34 41 34 41 34
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Control Variables: Government Consumption, Openness, Inflation, Patents, OECD, EU.
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Table C.2.3.2 - 2SLS and GMM Estimation of Performance Indicators on Competition Policy Indicators with Controls Variables
Variables PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF PERF
local local dominance dominance antitrust antitrust competition competition efficiency efficiency
Technique 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
COMPlaw 0.740 0.729 0.560 -0.114 -0.396 -0.482 -0.770 -0.861 0.025 -0.169
(1.028) (0.995) (1.211) (1.195) (1.297) (0.890) (0.799) (0.551) (0.818) (0.645)
R2 0.284 0.283 0.352 0.363 0.254 0.209 0.4535 0.437 0.468 0.456
SER 0.529 0.529 0.623 0.618 0.667 0.687 0.41112 0.417 0.421 0.426
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
COMPeconomics 1.972 2.004 2.624 2.463
∗ 2.383 2.407∗ -0.088 -0.138 0.872 0.883
(1.964) (1.034) (2.184) (1.167) (1.806) (1.130) (1.099) (0.676) (1.117) (0.668)
R2 0.125 0.182 0.125 0.182 0.324 0.309 0.571 0.550 0.595 0.591
SER 0.749 0.724 0.749 0.724 0.619 0.626 0.377 0.386 0.383 0.385
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
COMPdejure 1.438 1.746
∗∗∗ 2.149∗ 2.127∗∗ 3.192∗∗ 3.097∗∗∗ 1.438 1.746∗∗∗ 2.149∗ 2.127∗∗
(0.899) (0.466) (1.051) (0.675) (1.084) (0.892) (0.899) (0.466) (1.051) (0.675)
R2 0.325 0.257 0.392 0.394 0.330 0.557 0.325 0.257 0.392 0.394
SER 0.530 0.557 0.620 0.619 0.640 0.380 0.530 0.557 0.620 0.619
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
COMPdefacto 1.282
∗ 1.279∗∗∗ 1.458∗ 1.499∗∗∗ 2.087∗∗ 1.880∗ 0.826 0.620 1.040∗ 0.944∗
(0.618) (0.274) (0.715) (0.437) (0.665) (0.877) (0.455) (0.491) (0.457) (0.409)
R2 0.329 0.330 0.440 0.431 0.503 0.535 0.565 0.581 0.591 0.604
SER 0.536 0.536 0.620 0.625 0.576 0.558 0.394 0.387 0.396 0.390
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
Control Variables: Government Consumption, Openness, Inflation, Patents, OECD, EU.
Instrumental Variables: British Colony, Age of Democratic Regime, Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization.
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